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Siting conflict and peace in post-tsunami Sri Lank a and Aceh, Indonesia
JENNIFER HYNDMAN
The article aims to analyse two policy narratives that were politicised in the context of post-tsunami response in Eastern Sri Lanla
and Aceh, Indonesia. These areas had been alfected by war for several decades before the tsunami hit. The lirst narrative of public
safety saw government imposition of post-tsunami buffer zones, osrcnsibly as measures to protect those affected, but they also
incited tensions in both location& The second relatss to post-tsunami aid distribution. Developing policies and implemurting bodies
for tsunami aid has proven highly contentious, but uniquely so in each location. Whereas the tsunami in Sri Lanka has been
followed by renewed frghting and the end of the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement, the province of Aceh enjoys the fruits of the 2005 peace
agreement that has created greater autonomy from central govemment and greater access to resources than ever before Each
conllict has historically and geopolitically distinct antecedentq resulting in very different post-disaster policy context6 and political
challenges on the ground.
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The tsunami of 26 December 2004 led to extraordinary
devastation and destruction for peoples of the Indian Ocean
Basin region. The earthquake that spawned it killed an
estimated 167,000 people in Aceh, the closest land mass to
the epicentre on the Indonesian island of Sum atra. In Sri
Lanka, more than 36,000 people died, and another 800,000
were displaced from their homes. Overseas aid was unpre-
cedented. In total, more than USD 13 billion was pledged,
with more than USD 5 billion coming from private
individuals and companies. Yet, in comparison the destruc-
tion and loss of life from the immense earthquake that
struck Pakistan soon after hardly registered among private
donors of the global North less than one year later (Grundy-
Warr & Sidaway 2006).
Several of the states affected by the 2004 tsunami were
host to long-term conflicts before the disaster, including
Aceh and Sri Lanka, but also Burma (officially known as
Myanmar), Somalia, and India. This coincidence of huma-
nitarian crises 
- 
conflict on the one hand, and the tsunami
on the other 
- 
raises important questions: What effect did
the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean Basin have on the
extant contexts of conflict and peace in Aceh and Sri Lanka?
What policy narratives were mobilised in the aftermath of
the tsunami in each location? Did these tsunami-related
policies intersect with the extant conflicts in both environ-
ments? This article aims to provide some preliminary
responses to these questions.
Policy matters; there is no such thing as a 'natural'disaster
(Smith 2006). A widely-held view within disaster manage-
ment is that human decisions and actions shape the outcome
of particular emergencies. For example, in 2008, Burma (or
Myanmar in official parlance) was drastically affected by
Cyclone Nargis, which killed 130,000 people and displaced
over two million more along the Irrawaddy Delta. This
violent storm and the waves it generated became a full-
blown humanitarian disaster because of government policy.
Virtually no international aid organisations or staff were
allowed into the area to assist those affected until almost one
month after the cyclone hit. The idea of a policy-induced
disaster is pertinent to all humanitarian crises, whether it is
related to conflict, tsunamis, cyclones, earthquakes, or other
calamities.
Adding to existing literature on the intersection of 'man-
made' versus onatural' disasters (Wisner et al. 2004; Kelman
& Gaillard 2007), this article juxtaposes geographies of
conflict, devastation, and response in Sri Lanka and Aceh,
Indonesia, two places acutely affected by the 2004 tsunami.
A number of geographers (Korf 20A5; Lawson 2005;
Marston 2005; Olds et al. 2005; Stokke 2005; Kleinfeld
2007; Le Billon & waizenegger 2007; Gaillard et al. 2008)
and other social scientists (e.g. Jeganathan 2005; Kennedy
et al. 2008) have taken up different elements of the question
probing the relation of the tsunami to the conflicts that
preceded it.
This article seeks to juxtapose the cases of Sri Lanka and
Aceh in the context of post-tsunami aid and reconstruction.
Methodologically, however, the work on which it is based is
not strictly comparative research. The contexts of Sri Lanka
and Aceh, Indonesia are simply too distinct to forge such an
approach. The fieldwork for this article was conducted in
both countries after the tsunami. Interviews with tsunami-
and conflict-affected people in Sri Lanka took place in
February 2005 and 20A6. Interviews were also conducted
with UN personnel and the staff of international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs). In Banda Aceh, I
held 27 interviews with UN personnel, government repre-
sentatives, and INGOs in June 2007, as well as three
individual interviews and one focus group with former
combatants at that time.l In 2008, a further 50 interviews
were completed with a cross-section of the same groups by
research assistant Arne Waizenegger. This paper highlights
issues and policies common to both contexts, but also
examines responses at a more generalised level compared
to a single case study.
Perhaps the most important caveat framing this research
is that geographically diverse processes produced the
particular patterns and examples provided below. As
Matthew Sparke (2005, xiv) reminds geographers, 'any
assumption about geography either as a result of or as a
basis or container of spatial relations for other social
relations always risks fetishising a particular spatial ar-
rangement and ignoring ongoing processes of spatial
production, negotiation, and contestation'. To overstate
any geographical similarities is to ignore the multi-scalar
actors and relationships that generate distinctive histories
of struggle as well as contemporary policies and responses
to the devastation of the tsunami of 2004. Contextualising
the spaces of disaster, then, is an important departure
point.
The people of Aceh have long fought for autonomy
against colonial rulers as well as the centralised Government
of Indonesia. In Sri Lanka, the political aspirations of a
separate break away Tamil state by the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LITE) is a post-independence war, stemming
from the anti-Tamil pogroms of 1983 in Colombo. Calls for
a separate state in Sri Lanka can be traced to the early 1970s,
when constitutional reforms alienated Tamils in what was
formerly Ceylon. Both conflicts were in their third con-
secutive decade when the tsunami hit.
Today, several years after the 2004 tsunami event,
political and economic conditions in the two affected areas
are both dramatically different and starkly similar. In Aceh,
the Indonesian Government signed a peace agreement with
the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or
GAM) in August 2005, just eight months after the tsunami;
it was still operational at the end of 2008. In Sri Lanka,
political developments since the tsunami have intensified the
country's prolonged political crisis (Uyangoda 2005), lead-
ing to the abrogation of the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement in
2008 by the Sri Lankan Government in the wake of rebel
attacks. The number of civilian deaths since the tsunami
continues to climb in Sri Lanka, while Aceh enjoys a
precarious but continuous period of calm.
Despite this crude political contrast of peace and war,
both places continue to host political tensions and resent-
ment in the wake of tsunami reconstruction. The land-
scapes of conflict and displacement that preceded the
tsunami have not been and cannot be erased. Rather, a
variegated, politicised layer of aid overlays the earlier
disparities, histories, and geographies of displacement. In
Sri Lanka:
[s]truggles over inter-ethnic justice, neo-liberalism, economic
distribution, the disempowerment of women, caste bigotry and
such have shaped the [Sri] Lankan political landscape in
significant ways over the last decades . . . even the tsunami
cannot wipe out the imprint of these fault lines. (Nesiah et al.
2005)
As Michael Renner (2006) notes in the case of Aceh, the
ulamas (Islamic theologians) have blamed women for the
tsunami, calling them 'female sinners' whose dress, for
example, was not morally appropriate prior to the disaster.
Shari'a law pre-dated the tsunami but the Shari'a police did
not emerge until afterwards. A feminist analysis of these
political transformations remains to be done. Distinct
societal cleavages, political tensions, and economic dispa-
rities between Aceh and Sri Lanka pre-date the tsunami, so
any juxtaposition must avoid direct comparison that might
eclipse the nuanced differences and dynamics that have
historically and geographically constituted each place (Ac-
tion Aid 2006).
Political geographies of displacement: pre-
tsunami
The devastation of the tsunami overlays longstanding
geopolitical tensions, struggles for resources, and political
geographies of displacement (Hyndman & de Alwis 2004;
Nah & Bunnell 2005). In what follows I briefly sketch the
political backdrop to conflict in both Aceh and Sri Lanka,
setting the stage for the 'tsunami politics' that ensued after
the fateful waves of 26 December 2004 hit Aceh and Sri
Lanka.
Indonesia
Sentiments towards sovereignty and lslam in Aceh are more
pronounced than in most other parts of Indonesia. When
Dutch forces recaptured Indonesia in 1946, after Japan's
defeat in World War II, Aceh remained the only free region
of the archipelago (Waizenegger 20A7). Both Acehnese
people and politicians broadly supported the creation of
the Indonesian Republic in principle, in large part because
they believed it would be an Islamic state and Aceh would be
granted special provincial status (Aspinall 2007). The
creation of a secular and centralised Federal Republic of
Indonesia in 1949 betrayed Aceh's loyalty and support,
sowing seeds of rebellion.
In response to this dissidence, Indonesian President
Sukarno granted Aceh separate provincial status in 1959,
and gave it the status of a 'special region' (Daerah Istimewa)
in l96l to pacify the Acehnese. However, Sukarno's political
nemesis, President Suharto, stoked discontent during his
rule, beginning in the mid- l 960s. Feelings of exploitation
soared among the Acehnese in 197 | when huge oil and
liquid natural gas deposits were discovered near Lhokseu-
mawe and Lhoksukon in North Aceh. Exploration was
followed by the construction of what was then a huge
refinery in worldwide terms, financed as joint venture
between the Indonesian state-owned Pertafina and Exxon-
Mobil (Renner 2006).
Other companies seeking to run the refinery included
Doral International, a conglomerate owned by the Aceh-
nese businessman Teungku Hasan di Tiro (Waizenegger &
Hyndman in press). Di Tiro is a descendant of the last
sultan of Aceh, and a direct descendant of Teuku Cik Di
Tiro, a famous Acehnese national hero during the Aceh
War of 1873-19A3, so his defeat in the oil deal was seen as a
renewed expression of the unjust Javanese economic
exploitation and domination of the province. The confisca-
tion of villagers' land without compensation by the
Government of Indonesia and the deployment of as many
as 5000 troops to protect ExxonMobil from the emerging
rebel force also fuelled Acehnese nationalism (Renner
2006).
The Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has been fighting for
Aceh's independence from Indonesia since 1976. After a
number of attacks by GAM in 1989-1990 
- 
a period of
extensive human rights violations on both sides the
Indonesian military launched a massive counterinsurgency
operation in Aceh Province which continued on and off
into 2005 (Nah & Bunnell 2005). Conflict, violence, and
the sustained counter-insurgency had displaced more than
300,000 people since 1999, well before the tsunami hit. In
December 2A02, a cessation of hostilities agreement was
signed, drastically reducing the number of killings (Renner
2006). Yet, by May 2003, in response to renewed Acehnese
calls for a share of resource revenues, the Government of
Indonesia declared a state of emergency in Aceh (Hedman
2005), and the region was highly militarised by the
Indonesian government which installed more than 40,000
additional troops to forcibly relocate insurgents.
In October 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became
President of Indonesia, with a pledge to seek peace in Aceh.
Then, in December 2A04, the tsunami hit Aceh. Just eight
months later, after five rounds of talks, a peace agreement,
or memorandum of understanding (MoU), was signed in
August 2005, securing withdrawal of troops, the disarma-
ment of rebels, more energy revenues for the Aceh region,
and greater autonomy for local government in Aceh. As the
wording of the peace agreement specifically states: 'The
parties are deeply convinced that only the peaceful settle-
ment of the conflict will enable the rebuilding of Aceh after
the tsunami disaster on 26 December 2004 to progress and
succeed.' The newly elected president put it this way: 'The
tsunami produced an overwhelming moral, political, eco-
nomic, social imperative to end the conflict . . . I was
criticised by those who did not see any benefit from
renewed talks with GAM. But I was more concerned about
the judgment of history for missing this rare window of
opportunity to resolve the conflict' (President Yudhoyono,
opening speech, 'Building Permanent Peace in Aceh: One
Year After The Helsinki Accord' conference held in
Jakarta, l'4 August 2006). The principles of peace outlined
in 2005 were passed into law governing Aceh, in diluted
form due to resistance by hardliners, in July 2006 (Renner
2006).
Glassman (2005) argues that the Indonesian state was
partially to blame for the susceptibility of people to death
and destruction in Aceh during the tsunami. Despite Aceh's
natural wealth in resources, Javanese sub-imperialism and
the US-backed rule of President Suharto led to Acehnese
'people leading marginal lives and surviving on marginal
resources' (Glassman 2005, 166). This confluence of cold
war geopolitics, in which the West provided considerable
backing for the Indonesian military and Java-centric govern-
ance that ensured energy revenues flowed from Aceh to
Jakarta, generated a skewed political economy in the region.
Such political currents continued even in the wake of the
tsunami when, &s Glassman reports, GAM honoured the
ceasefire while the Indonesian military continued attacks on
GAM strongholds.
Sri Lanka
In Sri Lanka, a war characterised as one of violent
competing nationalisms between the secessionist Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (L[TE) and the Government of Sri
Lanka's armed forces has been waged for more than 25 years
(Jayawardena & de Alwis 1996, ix-xxii). Contemporary Sri
Lanka is an expression of a long history and geography of
struggle well-documented by Sri Lankan scholars (Abeyse-
kera & Gunasinghe 1987; Jeganathan & Ismail 1995;
Tiruchelvam 1996). At the time of writing (2008), the death
toll from the conflict exceeds 70,000, and internal displace-
ment follows as a consequence of the dynamics of conflict.
During the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government
and the LTTE, signed in February 2002, deaths fell
dramatically until 2006, when hostilities resumed despite
the Agreement. In a moment of donor hope in 2A03, a
conference to finance the reconstruction of war-torn Sri
Lanka met in Tokyo; USD 4.5 billion was pledged for the
'Regaining Sri Lanka' strategy, referred to as a ocash for
peace approach' (Jeyeraj 2005; Bastian 2A07a).
After the 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka, the World Bank
assessed the cost of reconstruction and recovery at approxi-
mately USD 1.5 billion. How to allocate these funds
emerged as one of the biggest hurdles between the govern-
ment and the LTTE. A joint mechanism to distribute
international aid to tsunami-affected areas was proposed
at an international donor forum in May 2005 (Kleinfeld
2007). Called the Post-Tsunami operational Management
Structure, or P-TOMS, the joint mechanism was a memor-
andum of understanding (MoU) that set out terms for a
working relationship between the Government of Sri Lanka
and the LTTE. P-TOMS had representation not only from
the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE, but also from
Muslim political parties. Muslim communities living along
the devastated east coast were disproportionately hit by the
tsunami, given their overrepresentation in that region.
Signed in June 2005, the P-TOMS MoU was also a
firebrand for political acrimony, galvanising Sinhalese
nationalist sentiment in opposition to it because of the
legitimacy it potentially conferred on the militant Tamil
nationalists, the LTTE. The Sinhala nationalist Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) party, in a coalition with the
sitting government, petitioned the Supreme Court in July
2005 on the grounds that P-TOMS violated the rights of Sri
Lankan citizens and the territorial integrity of the state on
the following grounds (Kleinfeld 2007, 179):
o The LTTE was a terrorist organisation and not a
governmental entity that could participate in such an
agreement.
o The committees described in P-TOMS were governmen-
tal in nature and could not legally do the work they were
charged to do without constitutional changes.
o Donor funds were funds of the Republic and could not be
controlled by an outside agency such as the World Bank
(as was outlined in the MoU).
o Treatment of persons within the tsunami disaster zone
(TDZ) discriminated against tsunami-affected persons
outside the TDZ.
If P-TOMS had succeeded, it might have served as a
blueprint for the constitutional change required for peace
beyond a ceasefire in Sri Lanka; however, it did not. The
Supreme Court largely agreed with the plaintiff, and the
MOU was never adopted. Then Prime Minister Mahinda
Rajapakse ran for President later in 2A05 on an anti-P-
TOMS platform and won by a slim margin (Bastian 2007b).
With his presidency and its consolidated alliance with
Sinhalese hardliners, such as the JVP, violence has increased
notably in Sri Lanka.
By early 2008, the Government of Sri Lanka had ended
the ceasefire agreement and the Nordic monitors of the Sri
Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) had left the country.
Bus bombs and suicide attacks in public areas, such as those
witnessed throughout much of the late 1990s, have resumed.
Between December 2004 and June 2A07, more than 6000
people were killed (Kleinfeld 2007).
Political geographies of displacement: post-
tsunami buffer zone policies
The tsunami generally worsened the humanitarian, social,
and economic situation of people living in the province of
Aceh and in Sri Lanka. The regions most affected 
- 
Western
Aceh on the northern part of Sumatra island and the eastern
coast of Sri Lanka2 
- 
both have long histories of exclusion,
poverty and conflict. Yet, the infusion of aid and the
patterns it took created very different dynamics in each
location. In both Sri Lanka and Aceh, money to rebuild
houses was plentiful, but coordinating housing reconstruc-
tion and securing the land on which to build them were more
elusive (Centre for Policy Alternatives 2005; Renner 2006).
In both countries 'buffer zond policies that initially prohib-
ited rebuilding homes near the sea generated another wave
of displacement, politicising humanitarian aid (Action Aid
2006). In the following section, I discuss a geography of
displacement engendered by this policy. The buffer zone
policy displaced yet again those who had already lost their
homes through the dislocation of conflict and then the
tsunami. In the case of Sri Lanka, this fuelled resentment
among minority ethnic groups, namely Muslims and Tamils.
Some Sri Lankan commentators have argued that the policy
was politicised land grabbing on the part of a precarious
government in one of the most densely populated countries
in the world.3
Aceh, in contrast, experienced a different kind of
politicisation in relation to the buffer zones; there, however,
much more resentment based on unequal treatment of
otsunami-affected' versus'war-affected' people emerged in
the form of protest. Below, I will address each of these
contexts in turn.
Fostering conflict, buffering blame in Sri Lanka
When the buffer zone made its entrance after the waves had left
behind the destruction [in January 2005], it was known by another
name, less popular 
- 
set back zone.It most certainly has lived up
to that title. (Perera 2005, 16)
The 'set back' or buffer zones declared by the Government
of Sri Lanka represented a state-sponsored dislocation for
many people along the east coast who had already been
affected by the dual disasters of war and huge waves. Before
the tsunami, during periods of intense conflict many Muslim
and Tamil communities had found sanctuary on these
unoccupied shores, which were narrow strips of land
between the sea and the more inland lagoons, called littoral,
or eluaankaral in Tamil). The hinterland, or paduuaankaral,
farther inland from the lagoons is occupied largely by
Sinhalese, the majority ethnic group, who were resettled
from other parts of the country through government
colonisation schemes during the nationalist periods of the
1950s and 1970s (Jeyeraj 2005).
From the time when the Sri Lankan Government
announced the buffer zones, or no-build areas, cries of
ethnic discrimination could be heard. Muslim communities
were over-represented as a proportion of the general
population in the hardest hit parts of eastern Ampara
District and therefore over-represented in terms of the death
and destruction wreaked in that area. So when the govern-
ment announced a 200 m no-build zone along the east coast
in contrast to a narrower 100 m buffer zane along the south
coast, where homes of the Sinhala majority arc most
numerous, Tamil and Muslim groups called the buffer zones
unfair and a sign of ethnic prejudice (de Alwis 2005). The
zones served to reproduce extant patterns of discrimination
against minority Tamils and Muslims in the wake of the
tsunami and fuelled mistrust (Hyndman 2007).
In both areas, the high population density and scarcity of
land also made the setbacks highly contentious. The
President's office announced that the government would
identify lands closest to the affected villages and build a
house for every affected house owner who lived within the
100 m buffer zone (Sambandan 2005). It was further
announced that owners of homes that were located inside
the zone 'will retain the ownership of his original land' and
that the government 'will not in any way claim ownership to
such property'; moreover, the owner would be 'entitled to
appropriate the land [within the 100 m zone] as he wishes,
except building on it'. In addition, the government was to
extend patronage to planting coconut or any other suitable
crop on the land (Sambandan 2005). Land within the buffer
zone could still be used for business purposes 
-a particularly
important resource for tourist operators in Sinhala-domi-
nated beach areas of southern Sri Lanka (MONLAR &
ANRHR 2005). Also, hotels were rebuilt less than 10 m
from the high tide water mark. So, while Sri Lankan citizens
could no longer reside along the south coast, tourists could.
The terms of rebuilding and compensation were also
contentious. Owners of homes and squatters alike could
have houses rebuilt with aid either from the government or
from an approved non-governmental organisation, but
tenants renting from owners received nothing except the
right to rent again if and when owners rebuilt (Centre for
Policy Alternatives 2005). The logic, or lack thereof, behind
the decision showed early signs of strain.
As the Institute for Policy Studies (2005) in Colombo
stated, if public safety was the prevailing aim, the buffer
zones should have been equivalent for all areas. The specific
environmental, social and physical characteristics of coast-
lines in different parts of the country ostensibly require
responses tailored to those geographies. Instead, Sri Lanka's
World Bank representative, Peter Harrold, noted that buffer
zones have been the single greatest barrier to progress in
housing reconstruction for those who lost their homes in the
tsunami (cited in Dias 2006).
The lack of evidence used to rationalise the buffer zones is
striking, a situation that politicised the policy and intensified
ethno-national tensions. On 28 March 2005, an earthquake
of similar magnitude and near the epicentre of the 2A04
tsunami shook much of Sri Lanka. President Chandrika
Kumaratunga stated that the mere occurrence of the earth-
quake, which did not create a tsunami, was a logical
rationale for the buffe r zone: 'the people now should realise
that the government, bearing in mind all allegation leveled
against it, has acted prudently with a vision and in a
responsible manner' (Associated Press 2005). Meanwhile
an opposition MP and former minister, Ravi Karunanayake,
retorted that in his riding of Crows Island 1500 National
Housing Development Authority houses went underwater in
the tsun ami, despite the fact that they were built more than a
100 m from the shoreline, which was proof, he said, that the
buffer zone would be ineffectual.
The buffer zones proved to be a political hot potato for
President Chandrika Kumaratunga, whose term ended in
November 2005, at which time her then Prime Minister,
Mahinda Rajapakse, was elected President of Sri Lanka.
Rajapakse quickly distanced himself from the Kumaratunga
presidency, first by changing his predecessor's government
tsunami response body from the Task Force to Rebuild the
Nation (TAFREN) to the Reconstruction and Development
Agency (RADA). Then, through RADA, he announced in
February 2006 that the buffer zane 'set back standards'
would be relaxed and that the setback standards of the
Coastal Zone Management Plan of 1997 would be revived
(The Sunday Times 2006).
While the Advisory Council of the Coast Conservation
Department approved exemptions from the buffer zone
policy even before Kumaratunga left office (Cassim 2005),
Rajapakse appeared to have a scientific reason for invoking
the Coastal Zone Management Plan. The plan had been
implemented but not enforced by various Sri Lankan
governments since the 1980s and was based on protecting
the coast and its inhabitants through appropriate vegetation.
The 1997 version allowed for setbacks between 35 m and 125
m from the permanent vegetation boundary, depending on
coastal conditions. That the plan pre-dated the tsunami and
appeared to the public to be based on environmental science
depoliticised the buffe r zone controversy.
Aceh's blueprint and buffirs
In Aceh, the size of buffer zones announced by the
government was substantially greater at the outset: 'Within
a two-kilometre area from the shore, we will avoid building
houses, offices, markets and shopping centres' (Mawardi
Nurdea, head of Aceh's urban planning and housing
authority in February 2005 cited in Sukarsono 2005).
Fishers were exempt from this policy and could live 400m
from the sea, but protests were raised nonetheless. There
was little consultation with those displaced by the tsunami
who abhorred the top-down policy (ACHR 2006). By
March 2005, arguments against the buffer zones by those
affected were faltering and community-based consultations
were demanded by donors and beneficiaries alike. The
blanket policy of buffer zones was lifted, as was evident
during a field visit in 2007 that I made to Lok Nga, c. l0
km west of Banda Aceh, on the hardest hit west coast.
There, an entire village had been rebuilt not more than 400
m from the sea, around a large mosque that had largely
survived the tsunami. While many of the Turkish Red
Crescent constructed houses were vacant due to poor
(seasonal) water supply at the time, they have been
considered among the best reconstructed buildings in the
wake of the destruction.
In both cases, the buffer zone proclamations initially
represented the position of central governments which then
evolved and became more geographically tailored and
politically-sensitive. In both Aceh and Sri Lanka, criticism
in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami also focused on
international non-governmental organisations' neglect in
consulting with their national and local counterparts in
the immediate aftermath of the tsunami (Couldrey & Morris
2005). As mentioned above, in Aceh the top-down policy
was contested early on. In Sri Lanka, although coordination
of tsunami aid began in the President's office, it soon became
clear that such centralisation of control was not politically
popular. Provincial civil servants met with international
NGO (INGO) staff until late in most nights in early 2005, in
attempts to allocate projects in affected areas to different
organisations; to make peace with warring NGOs who
claimed similar areas to rebuild, and to avoid duplicating
services or aid provision. [n Aceh too, INGOs competed
with one another for space to conduct their humanitarian
projects (Renner 2006).
One major policy distinction between the two contexts in
the delivery of post-tsunami aid 
- 
at least at the outset 
- 
was
the more centralised planning in the form of a blueprint by
the Government of Indonesia in contrast to the more
decentralised planning and coordination that eventually
took place at the national, provincial and district levels in
Sri Lanka, with international non-governmental organisa-
tions taking major roles and staking claims to particular
projects and places. The relative influence of these private, if
non-profit, international organisations compared to the Sri
Lankan governing authorities at various scales remains an
important issue that has been addressed by Sunil Bastian
(2007b) in his recent book.
The pursuit of private for-profit interests in humanitarian
reconstruction must also be addressed. In both Sri Lanka
and Aceh, the rationale for the buffer zones was public
safety, but as soon as the policy was announced in Aceh,
private sector developers and other political insiders began
jockeying for a piece of the post-tsunami reconstruction pie
outlined in the blueprint (Renner 20A6), attempting to
profit from what Naomi Klein (2005) has called 'disaster
capitalism'. Klein visited Sri Lanka after the tsunami and
voiced concern that tsunami funds would be used for
private contractors to build new port facilities and an
inland superhighway which were not necessarily related to
the destruction caused by the tsunami.
Researchers need to prove or dispute these ideas before
reproducing them further. [n Aceh, critics have recently
raised concerns about why a new superhighway was built
(not rebuilt) along Aceh's sparsely populated west coast after
the tsunami. Speculation that the discovery of oil reserves off
Aceh's west coast requires such road infrastructure and that
international donors may have known about such reserves
even before the tsunami occurred have circulated, but again
this requires further investigation to prove or disprove its
veracity.
Rich cousin, poor cousin: tsunami aid politics and post-
conflict integration
Just as disaster is never simply 'natural' (Smith 2AA6),
'reconstruction is never just a physical task' (Renner 2006,
13). In Sri Lanka along the eastern coast, tsunami-affected
people were also intensely affected by conflict, especially in
terms of geographical displacement. However, in Aceh,
those who were intensely affected by conflict largely did
not overlap with those devastated by the tsunami (Waize-
negger & Hyndman in press), In Sri Lanka, communities of
people displaced from conflict that were not affected by the
tsunami have been largely ignored, &t least in terms of
tsunami aid. One distinction between conflict-affected
people in Sri Lanka and Aceh is that the latter group
experienced a dramatic loss in terms of livelihoods after the
2005 peace agreement (MoU, 2005) that required rebel
fighters to demobilise and provided very limited funds for
their reintegration. However, the MoU (2005) does make
provision for reintegration in section 3 .2.3:
GoI [Government of Indonesia] and the authorities of Aceh will
take measures to assist persons who have participated in GAM
activities to facilitate their reintegration into the civil society.
These measures include economic facilitation to former comba-
tants, pardoned political prisoners and affected civilians. A
Reintegration Fund under the administration of the authorities
of Aceh will be established.
The MoU continues to state that all former combatants will
receive an allocation of farmland, employment, or adequate
social security. However, the number of combatants listed in
the MoU (3000 military troops) is widely considered to be an
undercount (Renner 2A0q Hence the funds for reintegration
are paltry. While some senior GAM leaders did receive a
opeace dividend' from the 2005 agreement in the form ofjobs
with the government agency for reconstruction (BRR, or
Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi), the benefits were
bestowed among a small, elite minority (Waizenegger &
Hyndman in press).
In Aceh, deep-seated resentment has emerged based on
the uneven distribution of funds between GAM comman-
ders versus foot soldiers and on the dramatically different
levels of aid available to tsunami survivors as compared to
demobilised soldiers: 'The tsunami victims were the lucky
ones .. . At least they got help' (Ida Wati, former GAM
rebel, cited in Honorine 2007);'while almost USD 8 billion
is committed to dealing with the aftermath of the tsunami,
only USD 200 million is pledged for reintegration efforts'
(Hollenbeck 2007).
A great number of GAM are frustrated, including
combatants, non-combatants, and prisoners given amnesty:
We also find a lot of dissatisfaction among GAM themselves.
Their job is to fight, so now they are unemployed. They face
problems feeding their families. There is a reaction to the fancy
sars and 'Indonesian' behaviour that high ranking GAM have
shown. GAM commanders got reintegration funds, but fioot
soldiers got nothing. There is a lot of resentment. (interview with
a government representative in Banda Aceh, June 2007).
Reintegration is a highly political matter, with the potential
for strong politicisation. The inadequacies of reintegration
to date are explored in more depth by other authors
(Waizenegger & Hyndman in press), but this pressing and
current problem in Aceh distinguishes it from Sri Lanka,
where the cessation of hostilities, let alone peace or
reintegration, remains elusive.
Without conclusion
Having briefly traced the unique antecedents to conflict and
policy contexts in Aceh and Sri Lanka, this article has
illustrated and analysed the broad contours of post-tsunami
political geographies. In Aceh, evidence that the tsunami has
accelerated and facilitated peace has emerged. In Sri Lanka,
the history, terms and dynamics of conflict since the 2004
disaster are very different, but they have clearly intensified
the country's prolonged political crisis. Policies ostensibly
aimed at improving public safety in the event of another
tsunami instead created antagonism. Government buffer
zone policies to restrict rebuilding in designated setback
areas along the coast proved highly contentious in both
environments, but their outcomes were very different. In Sri
Lanka, the buffer zones arguably fuelled ethno-national
tensions if not outright conflict, whereas protest of this top-
down policy by government (and the donor community) was
met with a new, more consultative approach to post-tsunami
reconstruction.
Likewise, various policy mechanisms, or blueprints, for
distributing post-tsunami aid also proved to have signifi-
cance beyond the mere logistics of reconstruction. In Aceh
the peace agreement specified that some government jobs at
the reconstruction agency (BRR) would be made available to
ex-GAM members as part of a peace dividend. The blue-
print created both the BRR agency for reconstruction and
the BRA (Badan Reintegrasi Aceh) agency for reintegration,
with formal (if contested) mandates and timelines for
operation. In Sri Lanka, no joint mechanism was ever
agreed upon. The Post-tsunami Operational Management
Structure (P-TOMS) MoU was a promising political com-
promise while it lasted. Representation by Muslims, the
LTTE rebels, and the Sri Lankan Government made it both
an explosive but potentially radical intervention to enable
humanitarian aid to be delivered. The political geographies
of post-tsunami Aceh and Sri Lanka are thus, in one sense, a
study in contrasts.
The political landscapes of Aceh and Sri Lanka today are
strictly incomparable, yet their common histories of conflict
and the tsunami of 2004 warrant further probing. In
December 2006, Irwandi Yusuf, a former rebel leader with
GAM, won the election for Governor of Aceh Province.
Irwandi, who surprised most observers by being elected at
all (he won 38% of the vote), was in jail for treason when the
Indian Ocean tsunami crashed on Aceh in 2004. Unlike
most of his fellow prisoners, he was able to swim to safety,
escaping his cell only after the waves hit. Provincial elections
in which newly formed parties will run are to be held in Aceh
in 2A09. Nonetheless, resentment is brewing among ex-
GAM foot soldiers and those who lost their livelihoods with
the cessation of hostilities. Disparities between the conflict-
affected and the tsunami-affected also fuel the tension
(Waizenegger & Hyndman in press).
All this is a far cry from Sri Lanka where a ceasehre
agreement that had been in place for more than five years
was cancelled in 2008, after two members of parliament (one
a cabinet minister) were murdered and many more civilians
killed in various bomb blasts in public spaces in the first half
of the same year (Kleinfeld 2007). Prospects for a ceasefire
thus looked increasingly slim, despite the hopes of donors
who in 2003 pledged billions of dollars for post-conflict
reconstruction. In 2009, a sustained Sri Lankan Govern-
ment offensive against the LTTE continued. The chances of
a ceasefire in this climate are slim to none.
More research needs to be done to ascertain the subtle
and contested dynamics of sovereignty and governance at
multiple scales in the post-tsunami relief and reconstruction
period. The processes and policies employed by interna-
tional aid organisations, national actors, and those affected
by the dual disasters cannot be forced into a strictly
comparative framework. The imperial designs and modal-
ities of well-intentioned non-governmental organisations,
with headquarters in Europe, Australia, Japan, and North
America, may have been begrudgingly accepted by the
tsunami-affected countries as the price to be paid for
'humanitarian assistance', but more research analysing these
aspects of governance in the wake of so much aid is still
needed. Likewise, 'disaster capitalism' (Klein 2005) in Aceh,
Sri Lanka, and beyond has yet to be demonstrated. What is
clear is that disaster aid has no singular effect on conflict. It
may expand the political space to negotiate peace and at the
same time breed discontent among those required to give up
arms, as in the case of Aceh, or it may catalyse tensions
among ethno-national groups in a war of competing
nationalisms, as in Sri Lanka 
- 
a case of 'both/and'.
Notes
I Interviews in Aceh were interpreted with assistance from Arno Waizeneg-
ger. The project, funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRC), aimed to trace the different responses by aid
agencies to the tsunami.
2 The entire length of the Sri Lankan coastline was affected. The World Bank
estimated that 40oh of damage was along the east coast, 30% along the
southern coast, 20% in the north (another region seriously affected by
conflict), and l0o/u along the west coast.
3 I thank Sunil Bastian for his astute observation on this point.
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